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The aim of this article is to critically examine what I call Action-Centric Theories of Rep-
resentation (ACToRs). I include in this category theories of representation that (1) reject
construing representation in terms of a relation that holds between representation itself
(the representational vehicle) and what is represented, and instead (2) try to bring the
function that representations play for cognitive systems to the center stage. Roughly
speaking, according to proponents of ACToRs, what makes a representation (that is, what is
constitutive of it being a representation) is its being functionally involved in preselecting
or guiding the actions of cognitive systems. I intend to argue that while definitely valuable,
ACToRs are underconstrained and thus not entirely satisfying, since there exist structures
that would count as representations according to ACToRs, but which do not play functional
roles that could be nontrivially or in an explanatorily valuable way classified as repre-
senting something for a cognitive system. I outline a remedy for this theoretical situation
by postulating that a fully satisfying theory of representation in cognitive science should
have two factors; i.e., it should combine the pragmatic, action-oriented aspect present in
ACToRs with an element that emphasizes the importance of the relation holding between a
representational vehicle and what is represented.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The turn of the 20th century in cognitive science will
probably be remembered as a time when “embodied”,
“enactive”, and “extended” approaches came to play a
prominent role in theorizing about, modeling, and studying
cognition. Admittedly, there is (still) no universal
consensus as to how exactly we should understand these
approaches and the way they are interrelated (but see e.g.
Goldman, 2012; Shapiro, 2010). However, it seems safe to
say that they have two very broad characteristics in com-
mon. First, proponents of these approaches usually see
themselves as being in opposition to “classical” cognitive5
wski, P., Action guidanc
representation, Newscience, which construes cognition in terms of rule-based
symbolic computation. Second, they criticize the classical
view of cognition as too spectatorial or passive, and opt
instead for a view that emphasizes that cognition has
evolved in order to help embodied agents to control their
ongoing interactions with the environments they inhabit.
Among the “orthodox” assumptions of classical cogni-
tive science that are often criticized and discarded by
proponents of these new approaches is the idea that
cognition involves internal representations. Thus,
embodied, enactive, or extended cognitive science seems to
be a natural ally of anti-representationalism. Under closer
examination, however, it turns out that this diagnosis is an
oversimplification. There have been attempts to reconcile
representationalism with new approaches in cognitive
science (see e.g. Clark & Grush, 1999). In this article, I wille is not enough, representations need correspondence too: A
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of reconciliationdone that tries to reconceptualize the very
nature of representations by postulating that being a rep-
resentation is constitutively dependent on being somehow
involved in guiding the actions of a cognitive system
(Anderson & Rosenberg, 2004, 2008; Bickhard, 1993, 1999,
2004a, 2004b; for an attempt to combine this approach
with computationalism in cognitive science, see also
Miłkowski, 2013). Throughout this paper, I will call pro-
posals of this sort “Action-Centric Theories of Representa-
tion” (ACToRs).
Although I think that ACToRs are, in some important
respects, a step in the right direction, I also think that they
are fundamentally incomplete. ACToRs are too liberal and
underconstrained and thus do not give us a notion of rep-
resentation that is explanatorily nontrivial and valuable.
This is because at least some cognitive structures that
would have to count as representations according to AC-
ToRs do not meet what William Ramsey (2007) calls the
“job description challenge”: under closer scrutiny, it turns
out that those structures do not play functional roles that
are recognizably representational, and because of that, they
cannot be characterized as representations in an explana-
torily illuminating way. Showing that this is the case is my
first aim in this article. My second aim is to suggest away of
expanding the notion of representation present in ACToRs
so that it can meet Ramsey's challenge. According to my
proposal, what we need is a two-factor theory of repre-
sentation, one that combines the action-oriented or prag-
matic element present in ACToRs with the idea that
representations also owe their representational status to a
relation (“correspondence”) that holds between the rep-
resentation itself (the vehicle) and what is represented.
I will proceed as follows. In Section 2, I will first describe
what I take to be the basic tenets of ACToRs and then take a
closer look at two specific theories that are representative
examples of the action-centric approach, namely Mark
Bickhard's interactivist theory of representation and
Michael L. Anderson and Gregg Rosenberg's action guid-
ance theory of representation. In Section 3, I will present
Ramsey's idea of the job description challenge. In Section 4,
I will try to show that the notion of representation con-
tained in ACToRs is too liberal and underconstrained to
meet the job description challenge. In Section 5, I will
suggest that this problem can be dealt with by extending
ACToRs to create a two-factor theory of representation. I
will also present a very sketchy outline of how this sort of
two-factor theory might (and should) look.
2. Action-centric theories of representations
2.1. ACToRs: core ideas
It might be useful to introduce ACToRs by pointing to
what they are opposed to. Proponents of the action-centric
approach often claim that their proposals are based on the
rejection of a certain way of thinking about the nature of
representation, one that is deeply embedded in today's
mainstream philosophy and cognitive science. As Mark
Bickhard (2004b) puts it, this way of thinking construes
representations as encodings or correspondences, and it canPlease cite this article in press as: Gładziejewski, P., Action guidanc
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signet ring (the world or what is represented) in a piece of
wax (the representation). Correspondence-based theories
see representations as codes whose constituents are map-
ped on to constituents of the represented domain. Corre-
spondences are supposed to be established by some sort of
(natural) relation that holds between the representation
and what is represented. But what sort of relation is this?
This is a broad subject, but suffice it to say that causal-
nomological dependence, asymmetric causal dependence,
or isomorphism are some of the candidates that have been
proposed in the contemporary literature. Michael L.
Anderson and Gregg Rosenberg express a similar diagnosis
to Bickhard when they claim that the problem with many
contemporary theories of representation lies in the fact that
they are input-focused, meaning that “they give too much
importance to the ways in which the environment affects
the organism to endow its states with representational
meaning” (2008, p. 56). To put it very broadly then, ACToRs
are opposed to a very general idea about the fundamental
nature of representation, namely the idea that what is
constitutive of being a representation is a correspondence
between the representation itself and what is represented.
Characteristic of proponents of ACToRs is that, instead of
proposing yet another correspondence-establishing relation,
they attempt to make something of a paradigm shift in our
thinking about what representations really are. If most
“classical” theories are indeed input-focused, then ACToRs
can be described as trying bring the representation's out-
putdi.e., the relationship between representation and its
userdto the center stage. From this point of view, of crucial
importance for our thinkingabout thenature representations
is the fact that representationsare for theirusers,withall their
practical purposes. To put itmore precisely, we could say that
proponents of ACToRs approach the subject matter in the
followingway. First, theyaskwhat it is that representationsdo
for their users, or what is the “business” of using represen-
tations. Second, they treat ananswer tothisquestionasabasis
for their positive theoryof representation, in accordancewith
Anderson and Rosenberg's claim that “representations are
what representation do” (2008, p. 56, emphasis added).
So what function do representations serve for their
users? According to ACToRs, their role consists in controlling
or guiding the user's actions. Thanks to representations,
cognitive systems have the ability to practically orient
themselves in the world, perform actions that are adaptive
given the circumstances, or (pre)select one action among
many that are potentially available at a given moment.
One very important clarification about what I take AC-
ToRs to be committed to is in order. ACToRs can be inter-
preted in two very different ways. According to a weak
interpretation,ACToRs simplygive anaccountof the function
that representations play for representation-using systems.
According to a strong interpretation, (1) ACToRs are theories
of what constitutes representationsdwhat makes them
representationsdand (2) they put forward the thesis that
representations are constituted by their function in
providing guidance for action. The weak and strong in-
terpretations are clearlyverydifferent. Imagineananalogical
situation, in which someone claims that the function of cars
is to enable people to cover long distances. On one hand, thise is not enough, representations need correspondence too: A
Ideas in Psychology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
1 For example, a bacterium may have the ability to perform two ac-
tions: swimming and tumbling (Bickhard, 2004a). Swimming enables
self-maintenance when the bacterium is moving up a sugar gradient, and
so this is this action's condition of success. Tumbling contributes to self-
maintenance when the bacterium finds itself moving down a sugar
gradient, and so this is this action's condition of success.
2 Sometimes Bickhard (e.g. 1999) also claims that, in addition to in-
dications of interactions themselves, the interaction's internal outcomes
need to be indicated as well. If this claim is added to the theory, then
what is needed to set up an indication of interactive potentiality is not
only an indication of a possible action itself, but also an indication of
internal states that the former is predicted to produce.
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you interpret this claim stronglydi.e., as saying that what
constitutes a car is playing a role in enabling people to cover
long distancesdthen you end up with a thesis that is obvi-
ously false, since there exist other artifacts that carry out the
same function. Now, my aim here is not to challenge an idea
that I take to be fairly unproblematic, namely that repre-
sentations serve to guide or preselect actions. Iwill not argue
against a weak interpretation of ACToRs. I also do not think
that the weak interpretation is what proponents of ACToRs
argue for. What they mean to defend, I think, is the strong
interpretation of their thesis. And it is this version of action-
centrism with which I take issue. What I want to bring into
question here, then, is the idea thatwhatmakes something a
representation is the fact that it is involved in controlling the
actions of cognitive systems.
The discussion so far has given a very cursory intro-
duction to ACToRs by pointing out the basic ideas that they
have in common. Now I want to take a closer look at two
theories that I take to be emblematic of the action-centric
approach: Bickhard's interactivist theory and Anderson
and Rosenberg's action guidance theory. I will present both
theories in subsections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. However,
it needs to be stressed at the outset that both theories are
conceptually complex in a way to which I cannot fully give
justice here. For example, Bickhard presents his proposal
against a broader conceptual and theoretical background of
process ontology and an “interactivist” view of cognition as
such (see Bickhard, 2009). In addition, both Bickhard (1993,
1999, 2004a, 2004b), as well as Anderson and Rosenberg
(2004, 2008) put a lot of effort into developing their
respective theories in a way that avoids presupposing
representational notions when explaining representation.
In my reconstruction, I will pass over many of these details
and instead concentrate on what I take to be the essential
theses of both theories. I will also charitably assume that
both theories avoid vicious circles or metaphysical as-
sumptions that are in any way problematic.
2.2. Bickhard's interactivist theory of representation
Bickhardbuildshis theoryon the idea that representations
owe their normativitydthe fact that they are assessable for
truth or accuracydto the normativity of (inter)actions (the
following reconstruction is based on Bickhard, 1993, 1999,
2004a, 2004b). Actions have certain conditions of success,
and the normativity of representations is derivative, explan-
atorily and metaphysically, from that practical normativity.
But what does the normativity of actions consist in? Bick-
hard's answer to this question points to the fact that all living
systemsneedtomaintain themselvesbystaying inastate that
is far from thermodynamic equilibrium. Now, contrary to
some self-maintaining systems like a candle flamedwhich
keeps itself in existence by vaporizing wax into flammable
gases, but is able to do so only under one set of specific
external conditionsdcognitive systems have the capacity for
recursive self-maintenance. That is, the latter can maintain
themselves over a range of changes in environmental condi-
tions. Cognitive systems can differentiate environmental cir-
cumstances and change their course of action accordingly,
keeping themselves in a far-from-thermodynamicPlease cite this article in press as: Gładziejewski, P., Action guidanc
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action (type), there are (types of) conditions underwhich this
action contributes to the organism's maintenance. These are,
for Bickhard, conditions of this action's success.1
Bickhard observes that in cognitive systems of appro-
priate complexity, it will usually be the case that (1) there is
more than one possible action to perform in given circum-
stances, and (2) the system thus faces the challenge of pre-
selecting one of those actions in a way that maximizes its
self-maintenance. In such a situation, organisms will not
simply trigger a given action in given circumstances, butwill
rather develop an ability to set up what Bickhard calls in-
dications of interactive potentialities.Without delving into the
details of Bickhard's definition of indication,wemay roughly
say that indication I of some potential action A in circum-
stances C is an internal state (or process, if we choose to stay
closer to Bickhard's metaphysical framework) which is pro-
ducedasa resultof theoccurrenceofCandwhichenables the
system, ormakes it possible for the system, to performaction
A (for details, see Bickhard, 1993). Usually more than one
actionwill be available in a given situation, so thatmore than
one possibility for action will be indicated.2
According to Bickhard, indications of interactive potenti-
alities are a fundamental or basic form of representation. It
needs to be stressed, though, that what makes them repre-
sentations is not how they are related to the external world,
but rather the role they play with regards to (inter)actions.
They owe their status as representations to how they enable
the organism to act in an adaptive, anticipatory way. Every
indicated action has conditions of success associated with it,
that is, conditions that should occur if this action is to
contribute to the system's self-maintenance. AsBickhardputs
it, indicated (inter)actions “dynamically presuppose” that
conditions occur which are needed for those actions to be
successful. It is thosedynamicpresuppositions that constitute
ordetermine representational content. These contents are not
explicitly encoded for Bickhard, but rather are implicit in the
dynamical presuppositions of indicated actions.
Two important additional remarks are in order. First,
Bickhardclaimsthat theabovementionedstoryonlyexplains
the most fundamental or rudimentary form of representa-
tion, namely interactive representation. As I understand the
theory, these are representations with simple contents like
“Circumstances affording action X, now”. However, Bickhard
also claims (and attempts to show, see esp. Bickhard, 2004b;
Bickhard & Terveen, 1995) that other, more sophisticated
forms of representationdlike representations of stable
physical objects or abstract entitiesdare built upon the basis
of interactive representation.e is not enough, representations need correspondence too: A
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one very important advantage over any correspondence-
based theory. This is that only the former can explain not
only how representational error is possible, but also how
system-detectable representational error is possible (see
especially Bickhard,1999). For Bickhard, explaining how it is
possible for a cognitive system to detect the fact that it is
using a false or inaccurate representation is an important
criterion of adequacy for any theory of representation. This is
also where he thinks all theories based on an idea of repre-
sentation as correspondence uniformly fail. Animals seem to
have no way of telling whether a given correspondence-
establishing relation (causal co-variation, asymmetric de-
pendency, isomorphism, etc.) holds between the represen-
tation they are using and what they are representing.
Furthermore, from the point of view of correspondence-
based theories, error detection would need to generate a
regress: to detect an error of representation R1, the system
would need to form an independent representation R2 of
whether the correspondence-establishing relation holds
between R1 and the world; but now the problem reappears,
since similar sort of story would be needed to explain the
ability to detect an error in R2 (which would call for yet
another representation R3); and so on. From an interactivist
point of view, explaining error-detection seems to be
achievable in a rather straightforward way. The representa-
tion is false if its dynamic presuppositions are false. A
representation-user can detect this falsehood by detecting
that an action based on this representation has failed.
Representational error is detectable through action failure.
So whenever an action that was based on a representation
fails, detecting the occurrence of this fact is a way of telling
that the representation was false, which may in turn be
potentially useful for error-based learning.
2.3. Anderson and Rosenberg's action guidance theory of
representation
I will now turn to Anderson and Rosenberg's (henceforth
A&R) actionguidance theory (the following reconstruction is
baseduponAnderson&Rosenberg, 2004, 2008). At theheart
of A&R's proposal is the idea that the function of represen-
tation is to guide the actions of representation-users. Rep-
resentations are entitieswhose job it is to enable natural and
artificial cognitive systems to perform intelligent, adaptive
actionswith respect to theirenvironments.Whenpresenting
their case, A&R are mostly concerned with unpacking this
very broad and intuitive idea in a technical and detailed
manner. So, according to their technical proposal, “a mental
tokenT (of somegiventype) represents anentityE forsubject
S, just in case tokens of that type are standardly used by S to
guide its actions with respect to E” (Anderson & Rosenberg,
2008, p. 67). Let us take closer look at this characterization.
For A&R, a T token guides the actions of S by “making its
features available to the subject's motor systems and
rational control processes for use in making discriminating
choices between possible actions or possible ways of
executing actions” (Anderson & Rosenberg, 2008, p. 68).
Importantly, the category of representation-guided actions
is supposed to include both motor actions and cognitive
actions. By saying that T tokens are “standardly used” by S toPlease cite this article in press as: Gładziejewski, P., Action guidanc
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actions with respect to E in virtue of having an “enduring
conscious preference or conditioned reflex” to use T tokens
to guide its actions. A&R also put a lot of effort into char-
acterizing technically what it means for an action to be
performed “with respect to” some entity E. To cut a long and
complex story short and make it (relatively) simple, three
conditions need to be met for an action to be performed
with respect to E (the following discussion covers motor
actions only, although A&R treat cognitive actions in a very
similar manner). First, the action should be susceptible to
rational interpretation and have a “motivational reason”
behind it. Second, the motivating reason behind this action
should be an “assumption of information” about E, i.e. the
action should be such that it unfolds as though it were based
on assumption that T tokens carry information about E (the
system in question behaves “as if” it assumed that T tokens
encode information about E). Third, E should be the focus of
the expected change that this action is to bring about; more
precisely, E should be the entity that is continuously
monitored by feedback channels as the action is performed.
Action guidance theory can be illustrated with the
following simplistic example. Consider a very simple cogni-
tive system S, whose whole life boils down to approaching
some entities (say, food and reproductive partners) and
avoiding others (say, predators). S contains a very simple
mechanism, composed of two components: (1) M, which
sends “approach” or “avoid” motor commands to the effec-
tors, and (2) D,which is in the business of affectingM in such
a way that it actually sends one of those two commands to
the effectors, depending on whether D itself is in a state D1
(which activates approaching) or D2 (which activates
avoidance). In otherwords, D “decides”what should be done
and M moves the system in one of two ways. The whole
process is set up as though S acted on an assumption that D
encodes information about external states of affairs. Suppose
that on a given occasion S stumbles upon a token of the type
O (say, a piece of food), D goes into state D1 and thus causes
(throughaffectingM)Stomove in thedirectionofO. Suppose
further that D in the state D1 is standardly used to make S
approach Os. If this is the case, then D in state D1 could be
described as guiding S's actions with respect to Os, and thus
as representing Os for S. In other words, D1 would then
represent simple content like “Food here, now”.
One last observation to make about action guidance
theory is that A&R follow Bickhard when they claim that an
important strength of their theory is its ability to explain
system-detectable representational error. The way A&R
handle this subject is basically the same as Bickhard.
Representational error consists in the fact that an action that
was guided by a given representation “failed in its intent,
and it failed partly or wholly because of the guidance pro-
vided by that representation” (Anderson & Rosenberg,
2008, p. 78). This error in representation can be detected
when an action guided by this representation fails.
3. Ramsey's job description challenge
As was stated at the outset, my aim in this article is to
challenge ACToRs. It is important, though, to be explicit
about how I intend to do this. I will approachmy goal from ae is not enough, representations need correspondence too: A
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representation are usually treated in the literatur-
ednamely as attempts at naturalizing intentional content.
Instead of asking whether ACToRs give us a good theory of
how intentional content is determined, I want to concen-
trate on their explanatory value for cognitive science. More
specifically, my intention is to ask whether representations
postulated by ACToRs actually play their explanatory roles
qua representations; or whether explanations of cognitive
phenomena that posit internal structures meeting ACToRs'
criteria for being a representation actually earn their status
as genuinely representational explanations.
My discussion will draw on a strategy of evaluating the
explanatory status of representational posits in cognitive
science that was introduced byWilliam Ramsey in his book
Representation Reconsidered (2007). Ramsey's proposal
stems from a suspicion that the term “representation” is
often used by cognitive scientists in an excessively liberal
and unconstrained way, which deprives it of any true
explanatory value. When explaining phenomena of inter-
est, cognitive scientists show a tendency to call all sorts of
internal structures “representations”, including structures
for which it is far from clear why they should be classified
that way at all. The problem is not that those structures do
not play an important role in cognitive-scientific explana-
tions, but rather that they do not play their explanatory
roles as representations.
Ramsey (2007) postulates that we need a principled
way of judging the real explanatory value of different no-
tions of representation routinely used in cognitive science.
His positive proposal is founded on the idea of the job
description challenge (henceforth JDC). This idea is based
on an assumption that representational explanations in
cognitive science consist in describing cognitive mecha-
nisms whose components are functionally involved in
representing something. That is, something explains a
given phenomenon as a representation because it functions
as a representation in a mechanism responsible for that
phenomenon (this assumption is in line with the mecha-
nistic outlook on the nature of cognitive-scientific expla-
nation, see e.g. Bechtel, 2008). Meeting the JDC requires
showing how exactly a given internal structure or state
posited as a representation actually serves or functions as a
representation in a given cognitive mechanism.
The procedure of using JDC runs roughly as follows (see
Ramsey, 2007). One starts by examining the conceptual and
explanatory practice of cognitive scientists in order extract a
specific notion or a way of understanding representation
that is implicitly or explicitly present in this practice. In
doing so, one must concentrate on the functional roles that
are attributed to purported representations, that is, their
“job description”. Second, one needs to take a closer look at
this jobdescriptionandaskwhether statesor structures that
meet this job description can be classifieddin an intuitive,
natural and understandable mannerdas playing the role of
representation. Does it make sense to describe these struc-
tures as standing-in for something? Or does the intentional
content we may attribute to them determine their func-
tional role within the system or mechanism in which they
are embedded? According to Ramsey, if answers to ques-
tions like these are positive for a given notion ofPlease cite this article in press as: Gładziejewski, P., Action guidanc
plea for a two-factor theory of representation, New
j.newideapsych.2015.01.005representation, then this notion meets the JDC. Using this
notion should give some real explanatory purchase or
enable us to understand phenomena in way that is impos-
sible without it. On the other hand, if the answers are
negative in a given case, thenweare dealingwith a notion of
representation that fails to meet the JDC. This notion turns
out to be superfluous and devoid of real explanatory value.
We could just as well do without it in our explanations and
not lose theoretical insight into the phenomena of interest.
Before I return to discussing ACToRs, let me illustrate the
procedure outlined above with a concrete example taken
from Ramsey's book (this example will also prove useful
further down the line inmyargumentation against ACToRs).
Among a number of cognitive-scientific representational
notions that Ramsey (2007) examines there is what he dubs
the “receptor notion”. Ramsey thinks this is one of the most
prevalent ways of conceptualizing representation in cogni-
tive science (particularly in connectionist modeling and
cognitive neuroscience). Receptors are supposed to repre-
sent in virtue of the fact that they reliably co-varywithwhat
is represented. For example, the role of representing a
stimulus S is often ascribed to an individual neuron in the
visual cortex of an animal on the basis that its activity reli-
ably co-varieswith presence of S in the animal's visual field.
Do receptorsdor, rather, our concept of representations as
receptorsdmeet the JDC? Ramsey's discussion of this issue is
quite complex anddetailed, so for the sake of space, Iwill only
present the gist of his analysis (for details, see Ramsey, 2007,
pp.118e150). The first thing to note is that the basic notion of
representations as receptors is far too liberal. There are
numerous reliable co-variances in the universe that, as it
seems, do not represent anything or do not play any repre-
sentational function. Thus, if we were to accept receptors as
genuine representations, we would be faced with pan-
representationalism, which would in effect trivialize repre-
sentational explanations. One plausible way of avoiding this
problem is to add a teleological element to the receptor
notion. Following Dretske (1988), we might characterize re-
ceptors as structures that (1) reliably co-vary with some state
of affairs and (2) are functional for some larger system or
mechanism because of this co-variance. For example, a neu
ron in a visual cortexmay not only co-vary with the presence
of a stimulus, but also be functional (say, by producing app
ropriate behavior, like avoidance) for the organism precisely
because it co-varies with it. However, even now the receptor
notion is still too liberal, since we can point out counterex-
amples, that is, structures in the world that meet both those
criteria but clearly do not function as representations. To take
oneofnumerouscounterexamplesgivenbyRamsey, thefiring
pin's function is to activate thedischarge of the roundbybeing
reliably activated by pulling the trigger, but the firing pin
obviously does not represent that the trigger was pulled.
It seems, Ramsey observes, that there is a one last way to
rehabilitate the receptor notion, namely by adding the
concept of information to the picture. It might be said that a
receptor is a representationwhen, invirtueof co-varyingwith
a state of affairs, it encodes information about that state of
affairs and is functional for a larger system because of the
information it encodes. Ramsey goes to great lengths to
neutralize this move aswell. Roughly, he argues that in order
to defend her case, the proponent of the receptor notione is not enough, representations need correspondence too: A
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variance and information in such a way that it is possible to
show that the latter, and not the former is what makes the
receptor functional (otherwise we fall back on the firing pin
counterexample). But Ramseyargues that this is onlypossible
if we assume that the information is used by a full-blown
(human-level) intentional agent who is able to understand
the entailment relationholding between the receptor and the
(represented) state of affairs. However, if this is so, then we
cannot make use of the receptor notion to understand rep-
resentations in the sense that is of interest to cognitive sci-
entistsdthat is, mental representations which are supposed
to be located inside cognitive systems and used inside
themdsince we cannot (under the threat of homuncular
fallacy or vicious regress) postulate agents with human-like
interpretative abilities populating the insides of organisms.
The upshot of Ramsey's discussion of the receptor notion
is this. Purported receptor representations are not in fact in
thebusiness of representinganything. Theway they function
is more similar to the way gear-wheels function than to the
way the things that we pre-theoretically recognize as rep-
resentationsdlikemaps, fuel gauges, or sentences of natural
languagedfunction. For example, there is no sense inwhich
receptors stand in for anything. No doubt receptors causally
mediate between states of affairs, but causal mediation is
obviously not sufficient for representation. Thus, according
to Ramsey, the receptor notion does not meet the JDC.
4. Do ACToRs meet the JDC?
4.1. ACToRs and the JDC
Notice the affinity between Ramsey's project in Repre-
sentation Reconsidered and the aim of proponents of ACToRs.
Bothprojects explicitlyconcentrateon the functional role that
representations (purportedly) playwithin a cognitive system.
In other words, when developing their theories, proponents
of ACToRs are asking precisely the type of questionwe should
be asking, according to Ramsey, if we want an explanatorily
valuable notion of representation, namely: What is it that
representations do something for their users? Because they
explicitly characterize representations in functional terms, it
seems that ACToRs can be quite straightforwardly confronted
with the JDC. All we need ask is whether internal structures
that meet the “action-centric” functional criteria for being a
representation in fact serve roles that are recognizably and in
some illuminating or nontrivial way representational.
While I think that theyareastep inarightdirectionwhen it
comestoprovidinguswithanexplanatorilyvaluablenotionof
representation, as they stand, ACToRs fall quite short of
meeting the JDC. In subsections 4.2 and 4.3, I will showwhy I
think this is the case by discussing the shortcomings of,
respectively, Bickhard's interactivism and A&R's action-gui
dance theory. In subsection 4.4, I will consider a possible ans
wer tomyworries and showwhy this answer is unsatisfying.
4.2. Bickhard's interactivist theory: a counterargument and a
counterexample
Let me start with Bickhard's interactive theory. I think
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JDC. One of these is purely conceptual, while the other is
based on a counterexample drawn from actual empirical
work done in cognitive science.
The first argument rests on the observation that there is
no non-question-begging way of showing how exactly the
function played in a cognitive system by indications of
interactive potentialities can be qualified as representa-
tional. According to interactivism, those indications are
internal structures or processes that (1) are activated or
arise before the organism engages in particular action (say,
predator avoidance); (2) can, and sometimes will, lead to
the organism actually performing this action; (3) have se-
mantic or representational contents that are determined by
the conditions of success (dynamic presuppositions) of the
action to which they can lead. Note that according to the
theory, the representational status of indications of inter-
active potentialities is fully constituted by the role they play
with respect to guiding or preselecting action. In other
words, indications have property (3) in virtue of having
properties (1) and (2). We may say, then, that the whole of
Bickhard's project is to explain representational norma-
tivity with the normativity of action. However, we need to
keep separate two alternative ways in which this could be
done. According to one possible strategy, wemight say that
the normativity of action is somehow explanatorily and/or
metaphysically relevant to the normativity of representa-
tion. This way of framing the issue invites a theory ac-
cording to which something is a representation in virtue of
being appropriately related to possible actions. But this
does not mean that the appropriate connection to a
possible action is, by itself, (necessary and) sufficient to
make something a representation. My intention is not to
argue against this idea. In fact, I take it to be on the right
track (see Section 5).
According to the second possible strategy of explaining
representational normativity in terms of the normativity of
actiondwemay call it the “reductive” strategydthe former
is, as the saying goes, “nothing over and above” the latter.
From this perspective, an action having conditions of suc-
cess is the same as a representation (indication of interac-
tive possibility) having content. However, this way we do
not account for the nature of representations, but rather
render representations explanatorily useless. Everything
said using representational talk could be more economi-
cally said by reference to actual or possible (inter)actions
and their conditions of success. There is no rationale for
introducing representations into the picture. The simple
fact that some internal activity could eventually cause an
action whose success depends on environmental condi-
tions gives, by itself, no leverage to the idea that this ac-
tivity represents those conditions. Now, I think that by
simply identifying dynamic presuppositions with (implicit)
contents, Bickhard is committed to this second, reductive
strategy. Given that this strategy is unsuccessful, I see no
reason for claiming that interactivism gives us an explan-
atorily valuable notion of representation.
A proponent of the interactivist theory of representation
might reply to this by pointing to the fact that interactive
representations are not explicit, but rather represent their
contents only implicitly. By giving this sort of response, thee is not enough, representations need correspondence too: A
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calls a “tacit” notion of representation (see Ramsey, 2007,
pp. 151e187). Supposed tacit representations are not enco-
ded in some specific neural or computational structures, but
are rather non-locally “embodied” in the internal functional
architecture of a cognitive system as a whole (e.g. in the
pattern of connection weights between the nodes of a
neural network). Although it is not possible to delve into
this topic right now, it needs to be stressed that it is highly
debatable whether the notion of tacit or implicit represen-
tation meets the JDC. In fact, Ramsey (2007) presents a
strong case for claiming that there is no way in which tacit
or implicit “representations” are in fact in the business of
representing anything. He argues that attributing tacit
representations to a given systems boils down to saying that
the system as a whole has some dispositional profile (e.g. it
reacts differently to different categories of objects). But this
does not entail that there is anything even remotely func-
tionally resembling a representation inside the system.
Now, I do not want to simply preclude the possibility
that there are such things as tacit or implicit representa-
tions. However, I think that even if someone categorizes
something as an implicit representation, she needs to pro-
vide a good rationale for using representational talk at all.
Does Bickhard's theory give us such a rationale? If so, what
might it be? I think that the interactivist answer to these
questions would probably run as follows. Each indicated
action has some dynamic presuppositions, i.e. conditions of
success. Those dynamic presuppositions are, according to
Bickhard's theory, what determines the representational
content. However, there is nothing in the system that
would explicitly represent this content. So the environ-
mental conditions that constitute the dynamic pre-
suppositions of indications of interactive potentialities
must be represented only implicitly. Notice, however, that
this sort of answer manifestly begs the question. It simply
gives us no good reason to postulate representations in the
first place. It merely presupposes representations. In-
dications of interactive potentialities enable the organism
to perform actions that have conditions of success. This is
the only way in which those indications are related to
external conditions. Saying that they also represent con-
tents, even implicitly, simply adds nothing genuinely new
or explanatorily valuable to the picture. Thus, again, there is
no theoretical or explanatory benefit in postulating repre-
sentations here.
Let me now turn to the second, more empirically-
oriented argument against interactivism. The point is sim-
ple: there exist clearly non-representational explanations in
cognitive science that nonetheless do meet the criteria for
being representational put forward by interactivism. Expla-
nations of this kind constitute counterexamples for interac-
tivismandshowthat thenotionof representationembedded
in Bikchard's theory is too liberal to meet the JDC.
To see this, consider a famous work by Randall Beer
(2003) that is often cited as a model example of anti-
representationalism in cognitive science. In this study,
Beer describes a virtual organismda result of many gen-
erations of virtual natural selectiondinhabiting a two-
dimensional virtual environment. The agent's movements
are controlled by a three-layer neural network attached to aPlease cite this article in press as: Gładziejewski, P., Action guidanc
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movements in order to engage in one of two possible ac-
tions: catching or avoidance. Its whole virtual “life” consists
of facing the challenge of avoiding diamond-shaped objects
and catching circles, with both kinds of objects falling on it
from above. Importantly, the agent stumbles upon not only
diamonds and circles, but also hybrids of these two shapes
whose categorical membership is more vague.
In his article, Beer (2003) has shown that although the
agent exhibits behavior that should earn it the status of a
minimally cognitive system (it had an ability for active cate-
gorical perception of objects falling on it), the network that
controls its movement does not make use of any internal
structures that would deserve the label “representations”.
Beer's reasoning for this latter claim is familiar: his dynamic-
systems-based analysis of the mechanism controlling the
agent's actions showed that there is nothing inside this
mechanism that could be nontrivially described as perform-
ing a representational function, thus rendering representa-
tions explanatorily useless in this case. The virtual agent does
notmake use of any kind ofmodel of its environment. It does
not make use of any kind of diamond- or circle-detectors
either, as there are no internal states that would systemati-
cally and exclusively co-vary with either of those shapes.
Although the system's behavior as a whole could be usefully
described using intentional-sounding categoriesdlike
“deciding” or “intending” to avoid objectsdthere are no in-
ternal, causally relevant structures governing its actions that
correspond to those categories. All in all, to put it in Ramsey's
terms, Beer's virtual agent is a non-representational system
because there isnothing inside it thatwouldmeet the JDC (i.e.
play a truly representational function).
Notice, however, that despite being a non-
representational system, Beer's agent nonetheless seems
to meet interactivism's criteria for being representational.
First, it has the ability to select one of two possible actions,
each of which has some conditions of success (dynamical
presuppositions) and which could potentially fail, as e.g.
when the system “decides” to catch a diamond. Second, the
agent is controlled by a neural network that makes use of
internal states and processes that meet the criteria for
indicating interactive potentialities. Whenever the organ-
ism scans its environment, there are ongoing patterns of
activity in the middle layer of virtual neurons (those that
send motor commands to the third, motor layer) that could
and sometimes eventually would cause the agent to
perform one of the actions available to it. The patterns
leading to each action seem to “compete” with each other
for control (as Beer [2003, p. 221] puts it, his results “[… ]
suggest that the ‘decision’ [about how to act] is repeatedly
made and unmade as the agent and the object interact”
until the organism eventually “commits” and actually
performs one of the actions). It seems, then, that interac-
tivism would have us think that in this case there are pat-
terns of internal activity that (1) precede action and (2)
could potentially lead to the agent performing a particular
action; thus we should say that these patterns indicate
interactive potentialities that therefore (3) represent the
action's conditions of success. It follows that Beer's virtual
agent is a non-representational system that is categorized
as representational by Bickhard's theory. This shows thate is not enough, representations need correspondence too: A
Ideas in Psychology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
3 Interestingly, the fly example is occasionaly also used by Bickhard and
his co-workers to illustrate the interactivist approach to representation (see
e.g. Bickhard&Campbell,1996;Bickhard&Terveen,1995).On this construal,
because the activation of neurons in the optic tectum enables the frog to
perform tongue flicking action (i.e. it increases the probability that the frog
will in fact perform this action), this activity indicates a certain interactive
potentiality, and thus constitutes a representation. However, conceptual-
izing this example in interactivist terms does not neutralize Ramsey's
critique any better than conceptualizing it using action guidance theory. For
example, theflycatchingmechanismremains anon-representational causal
mediation mechanism even if we accept that, as the proponents of inter-
activism point out, the neural activity in the frog's optic tectum causes
tongue-flicking action only ceteris paribus (for example, only if the frog is not
at the same time exposed to a shadow of a predatory bird; see Bickhard &
Campbell, 1996). I have decided to discuss the fly catching specifically in
context of A&R's theory because of how these authors develop this example
by introducing the notion of potential decoupling (seemain text for details).
4 In fact, there is one more difference between these two cases that A&R
mention: whereas in the slimemold case the environment directly controls
behavior, in the frog's case the stimulus first registers inside the brain, and
then action is controlled by this internal registration (rather than directly by
the stimulus). Oneof the reviewers of this article pointedout that itmight be
argued that, by assuming that registration is involved, A&R are not in fact
advocating a purely action-centric theory, but rather advocate a two-factor
theory of sorts. After all, by employing the frog example, they point not only
tohowthe (postulated) representations in theoptic tectumguide action, but
also to the fact they systematically co-varywith the presence of flies, which
may be considered as establishing some kind of Correspondence between
the representational vehicle andwhat it represents. Three things need to be
said in this context. First, despite the fact that this particular example in-
cludes co-variation between the representation and the represented object
aspartof the story, callingA&R's theory “two-factor”wouldbeunwarranted.
These authors do not claim that any sort of Correspondence is in any way
necessary to establish a representation.On their view,what is constitutive of
representation is solelyhowthevehicleguidesactionwith respect towhat is
represented. Nonetheless, this does not preclude the vehicle (sometimes)
being in addition causally or co-variationally related towhat is represented.
So detectors still fall within the category of representations according to
A&R. Thus, showing that these structuresare in factnot representational still
constitutes a count example to A&R's theory. I have decided to discuss the
frog example simply because A&R themselves employ it to illustrate their
version of an ACToR. Second, I think the criticism presented here remains
perfectly conclusive even when we stick to A&R's theory and completely
ignore the fact that the neurons in frog's optic tectum co-vary with the
presence offlies. If anything, ignoring this factwouldmake the case for frogs
using representations to detect flies even weaker. Third, as I see it, adding
registration to the story makes a difference in quantity, not quality, and it
boils down to the fact that the causal chain leading from the environment to
behavior is longer in the frog's case than in the case of, say, the slime mold.
This is not enough to render the frog's fly-detection mechanism represen-
tational (see a related discussion in Ramsey, 2007, pp. 189e203).
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liberal: it lets too many things count as representations. Of
course, someone might claim that interactivism shows that
our evaluation of the example should be reconsidered and
that we are dealing with a representation-using system
after all. But this move does not seem warranted. It would
require stretching the notion of representation beyond the
point of usefulness. As Beer (2003, p. 239) himself puts it, if
the mechanisms of the sort he describes “look nothing like
representations, and they act nothing like re-presentations,
then they are not representations, and continuing to call
them representations is just going to confuse everyone”.
4.3. Anderson and Rosenberg's action guidance theory and
the frog's fly detection mechanism
Let me now turn to A&R's action guidance theory. I think
this theory is also open to counterexamples. However, this
time instead of looking for a counterexample in cognitive
science, I would like to critically re-examine the case that
A&R themselves present as an illustration of their theory,
namely the famous fly-catching mechanism in frogs
(Anderson & Rosenberg, 2008; see also Lettvin, Maturana,
McCulloch, & Pitts, 1959). Whenever a fly or a fly-like
moving object is placed within a frog's field of vision,
retinal ganglion cells are activated, which in turn activate
neurons in the frog's optic tectum. Neurons in the optic
tectum are connected with neural structures that control
the frog's behavior. The mechanism is set up such that it
causes the frog to orient its head in the fly's (or fly-like
object's) direction and snap its tongue to catch it. Accord-
ing to A&R (2008), this is a simple representational
mechanism. What justifies interpreting it in representa-
tional terms is that the activity in the optic tectum is
functionally involved in guiding the frog's actions in a way
that meets A&R's functional criteria of being a
representation.
Whydo I think that the frogexample can in fact beused to
show that action guidance theory does not meet the JDC?
Basically, the idea is that by treating the fly-detection
mechanism as representational, A&R's theory is faced with
the same problems that bug the receptor notion of repre-
sentation discussed in Section 3. The fly-detection mecha-
nism employs an internal structure that is reliably activated
by the presence of flies (or fly-like objects) and whose
function it is to initiate actions with respect to that which
activated it. In other words, it acts a sort of action-guiding
receptor (see Ramsey, 2007). It turns out then that recep-
torsdor, rather, those receptors that are involved in con-
trolling the actions of cognitive agentsdconstitute at least a
subset of structures thatmeet the functional criteria of being
a representationput forwardbyA&R in their action guidance
theory. However, for reasons I have presented in Section 3, it
seems that receptors do not play a representational function
in cognitive systems. We may simply conceptualize them as
internal causal mediators without losing any explanatory
power or insight into the workings of a given system. The
same applies to frog's fly-detection mechanism. But this
means that theneurons in frog's optic tectumare anexample
of a nonrepresentational structures that nonetheless meet
A&R's criteria. If so, then it follows that action guidancePlease cite this article in press as: Gładziejewski, P., Action guidanc
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do not really perform a function of representing anything.
Action guidance theory is too liberal; the way it construes
representations falls short of meeting the JDC.3
When presenting their theory, A&R (2008) seem to
anticipate this sort of criticism and attempt to answer it
preemptively. They claim that we do have a reason to think
that fly-detection in frogs in achieved by employing rep-
resentations, and not simply by employing a multi-step
causal chain. To show this, they contrast (what they take
to be) representation-guided actions of frogs with a
nonrepresentational, purely casual action guidance in the
case of slime-mold's phototaxis. In short, they claim that
what distinguishes the former from the latter is that in the
frog's case there is a potential decoupling of stimulus and
response.4 There are two stages of processing at which this
decoupling can occur. First, internal registrationddefinede is not enough, representations need correspondence too: A
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formed in response to a certain kind of bodily (sensory)
change, and taken up into a behavioral control system”
(Anderson & Rosenberg, 2008, p. 62, n. 8)dcan be decou-
pled from external stimuli. For example, in the frog's case,
neurons in the optic tectum can register a whole lot of
stimulidlike bits of paper or dots on screendother than
just flies. Because these stimuli may have nothing in com-
mon physically, we cannot, according to A&R, explain the
frog's behavior simply by reference to the causal features of
the stimuli. Second, there can be a decoupling between the
registration and the behavioral reaction it causes. For
example, if we unilaterally remove the frog's optic tectum,
eventually its optic tract will innervate the intact part of the
optic tectum. As a result, the pattern of the frog's reactions
to stimuli will be inverted and the frog will snap its tongue
at the spot where the mirror image of a fly would be.
I do not think that potential decoupling is enough to
delineate representational from nonrepresentational
action-guiding mechanisms. First, the existence of decou-
pling between stimulus and registration by no means
entails that we need semantic notions to explain a system's
reactivity to stimuli. For example, although there is a range
of objects that can potentially be registered by a frog's
optic tectum, there is no reason not to think that these
objects do share some causal, or causally relevant, prop-
erties; namely, properties like being (appropriately) small,
being dark, or exhibiting a certain movement patterns. All
objects that activate a frog's snapping behavior have these
properties in common and activate it in virtue of having
these properties.
Second, the decoupling of registration and response can
be easily understood as an abnormal reversal or reshuffling
of a biological causal chain. By removing part of a frog's
causal optic tectum, an optic tract connects with the part of
the optic tectum with which it would not be connected
normally. Part A of a causal chain, which would normally
produce effect B, now produces effect C. The same sort of
reversal of a causal chain can be rather trivially achieved in
non-biological artifacts like light switches or taps, but no-
body would suspect these artifacts of being representa-
tional because of this.
Third, even if both types of decoupling co-occur in a
given mechanism, this still gives no leverage to a repre-
sentational, as opposed to purely causal, explanation of
this mechanism. Take the frog example again. The
mechanism that subserves the frog's snapping behavior
can be quite easily explained purely associatively, as a
sort of reflex. In the frog's natural environment, the
appearance of food is systematically correlated with the
appearance of stimulus that has a certain color, size and
exhibits certain movement pattern. The frog has a reflex
mechanism that causes it to automatically snap its
tongue in the direction of the stimulus. This reflex can be
activated by objects other than food, as long as they have
the appropriate features. Whenever this happens, the
frog's action is unsuccessful because it fails to provide the
frog with food. Furthermore, if we damage this mecha-
nism in a certain way, it can partially regenerate, but
(because of such and such causal or physiological factors)
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this sort of explanation tells usdthough admittedly in a
very general waydall we need to know in order to gain a
basic understanding of a frog's snapping behavior. Note
that it does not invoke representations or semantic
properties. Instead, it exclusively refers to a reflex-based
causal chain and a purely practical (nonrepresentational)
connection between the frog's actions and environ-
mental conditions.
Before I move on, let me be clear about exactly what I
am arguing for. I do not doubt that potential decoupling
distinguishes some action-guiding internal structures from
others. Furthermore, I do not want to put into question the
idea that this distinction can be theoretically or explana-
torily interesting and useful. As A&R (2008) show, a control
mechanism that is potentially decoupled can be more
flexible than one that is not, and therefore the former can
have some adaptive advantages over the latter. Nonethe-
less, I think it is far from clear how potential decoupling
could distinguish representational from nonrepresentational
action-guiding structures. In fact, I think that the frog
example shows that these two distinctions (potentially-
decoupled/not-potentially-decoupled vs. representational/
nonrepresentational) are orthogonal.
4.4. Error detection to the rescue?
I now want to investigate one potential line of defense
that a proponent of action-centric approach might use
against my argumentation. According to this defensive
strategy, the whole discussion of this section is incon-
clusive because I have failed to take into account one
crucially important element of ACToRs. As mentioned in
subsections 2.2 and 2.3, Bickhard and A&R claim that the
strength of their respective theories partially lies in the
fact that they can account for the ability to detect
representational error. According to ACToRs, representa-
tional error is recognized or detected on the basis of
failure of action. Now, one might propose that this ability
to explain error detection not only gives ACToRs an
advantage over correspondence-centric theories of rep-
resentation, it also enables them to meet the JDC. Ac-
cording to this line of reasoning, what gives some
internal state or structure a representational status in not
only the fact that it is appropriately involved in guiding
or pre-selecting actions, but also the fact that when it
fails in performing its action-related function, it fails in a
way that is detectable for a cognitive system. To under-
stand how something comes to play the role of repre-
sentation, one needs to take into account those two facts.
To say this in a different way, what is constitutive of
something being a representation is both that it plays a
role in guiding action and that, in virtue of being so tied
to action, it makes representational error-detection
possible.
I do not think that this argument is successful. To say
that action failure indicates inaccurate or false repre-
sentation, one needs to assume that the action in ques-
tion was guided by a representation in the first place.
One cannot treat action failure as way of telling that a
representation is inaccurate unless one has somee is not enough, representations need correspondence too: A
Ideas in Psychology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
5 It needs to be noted that in an article clarifying and defending the
action guidance theory, Anderson and Chemero (2009) seem to be aware
that treating action guidance as a sufficient condition for the functional
role of a representation is wrong: “[ … ] although the guidance theory
says that representations are such in virtue of their role in guiding action
(all representations are action-guiders), it does not claim that everything
that guides action is therefore a representation” (p. 308). However, this
sort of concession raises some problems for the action guidance theory.
First, it seems to suggest that the theory is only committed to what I have
called in Section 2 a weak interpretation of action-centrism. But this
would be disappointing, since not many people would argue against the
weak version of ACToRs, which simply says that representations are for
action guidance. Second, this concessive move naturally raises a further
question: If action guidance is by itself insufficient for making something
a representation, what other conditions need to be met? This is the exact
question I am attempting to answer in the present section.
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question was guided by a representation. More broadly,
it seems wrong to treat the possibility of detecting a
representational error as co-constitutive of having the
status of representation, because qualifying some pro-
cess as “representational error detection” requires pre-
supposing some understanding of representation whose
being-in-error might be detected. As long as a given
action is not guided by representations in the first place,
it is unjustified to say that a representational error has
been detected in this situation. At most, what has been
detected is a purely practical error, and not a practical
error that resulted from inaccurate representation, thus
indicating the inaccuracy of a representation.
There is one last point to be made before we move on.
One reviewer of this paper suggested that there is a way in
which we may treat the ability for error detection as
conferring a representational status on a cognitive struc-
ture. According to this suggestion, the ability to detect error
is representational as long as the error detection does not
modify action on-line, that is, as long as the action in
question is not modified immediately. As I understand this
idea, error detection should be considered representational
if it is used to control action off-line; for example, if it is
used to modify future as opposed to current actions.
I remain unconvinced. Consider two imaginary, simple
artificial systems: robot A and robot B. In both cases, their
movements are controlled by an artificial neural network
that does not make use of representations in any recog-
nizable or explanatorily valuable way, in the vein of Beer's
aforementioned artificial agent. Now, imagine we alter
both A and B by giving them the ability to receive feed-
back signals from the environment, which in turn enables
them to detect when their respective actions are failing.
There is one difference, though. In the case of robot A, the
feedback signal is used to modify actions as they unfold
on-line. In the case of robot B, the feedback signal is not
used to modify on-line action. Rather, B uses the signal to
change the connection weights in the network that con-
trols its movement in way that will modify the way it acts
in the future; in other words, it uses error detection off-
line, to prepare future, as opposed to current, actions. If
we follow the suggestion discussed here, somehow the
fact that the actions being modified are “postponed” in
time should make B a representational system, as
opposed to a non-representational system such as A. But
it seems to me that the way robot B works is not suffi-
ciently different from the way A works to make B repre-
sentational; after all, the actions of both robots were not
controlled by representations in the first place. I do not
see how the difference in the length of the temporal in-
terval that separates error detection from action modifi-
cation could turn a non-representational system into a
representational system.
5. Overcoming the limitations of ACToRs. An outline
of a two-factor theory of representation
Although the discussion so far has been critical of AC-
ToRs, my aim is not to discard the action-centric approach
altogether. I think ACToRs are on a right track. Rather, what IPlease cite this article in press as: Gładziejewski, P., Action guidanc
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selecting actions is not sufficient to make something a rep-
resentation.5 I think that ACToRs give us a good idea ofwhat
it is that representations do, but they leave unanswered the
question of how representations (as opposed to non-
representations) work. Another way to put it is that action
guidance is a good candidate for a genus of an explanatorily
valuable concept of representation. What is missing from
this picture is a good ideador any ideadabout the nature of
differentia specifica that distinguishes representational ac-
tion guidance from the kind of action guidance that is
achieved without employing representations.
Let me illustrate this point with an example. Imagine
that three people face the challenge of navigating their way
from point A to point B in a city they do not know. Suppose
that each person succeeds at navigating the route, but each
one does it using a different strategy. Person 1 is led through
the streets of the city by a local who already knows theway.
Person 2 is given instructions to follow a trail composed of
little red balls that, as it happens, are arranged in such away
so as to lead from A to B (thus, person 2 navigates the city by
being directly coupled with what we might call, following
Rick Grush, a “presentation”, see Grush, 1997). Person 3
succeeds because she is given a map of the city on which
both points A (her original location) and B are marked.
In each of those cases there is somethingdanother per-
son, a ball trail, a mapdthat can be attributed the role of
“action-guider”. But only in the case of person 3 can we
justifiedly say that her action is guidedbya representation (or
at the very least directly so guided, given that it might be the
case that person 1 is guided by a local who in turn is guided
byan internalmental representationof the city). Ifwewant a
theoryof representation, the crucial thing to ask is this:What
distinguishes the navigational strategy employed by person
3 from the strategies employed by the two other people?
I propose that the difference-making factor here is the
fact that in order to succeed, person 3 exploits what we
might generally call a “correspondence” between the map
and the terrain. More precisely, what I think makes the case
of person 3 a case of representation-use is the fact that (1)
this person (a representation user) uses a map (a represen-
tational vehicle) to guide her action with respect to the
terrain (what is represented), and (2) she does it by
employing a strategy whose navigational (action-guiding)
success is non-accidentally dependent onwhether a certaine is not enough, representations need correspondence too: A
Ideas in Psychology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
8 Importantly, the two-factor theory as I understand it here should be
distinguished from a two-factor theory of mental content defended by phi-
losophers like Ned Block (1986) and Hartry Field (1977). This latter theory
stems fromanattempt tocombine twoseparate theoriesofcontent: thecausal
or covariance theory (which states that mental representation's content is
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degreedbetween the map (representational vehicle) and
terrain (what is represented). But what sort of relation are
we talking about? Without delving into detail, it may be
characterized as a homomorphism or some kind of struc-
tural similarity between how constituents of the map are
spatially-relationally organized and how the constituents
of the terrain are spatially-relationally organized (see
Bartels, 2006; Cummins, 1989; O'Brien & Opie, 2004;
Swoyer, 1991).6 Importantly, however, it needs to be
stressed that the existence of this similarity is by no means
sufficient for making the map a representation. Rather,
what constitutes its representational status is both its
action-guiding function and the way performing this
function is dependent on the relevant relation holding
between the map and the represented terrain.7
What do I mean exactly by action guidance being
“dependent” on the relation between the representational
vehicle and what is represented? I mean that the relation
between the representation and what it represents is
causally and thus explanatorily relevant for whether the
representation succeeds in providing action guidance. I
understand “causal relevance” along James Woodward's
(2003) interventionist lines here, basically meaning to say
that by intervening in whether the appropriate relation
holdsdor by intervening in the degree to which it
holdsdwe could manipulate the representation user's
practical or navigational success. This way, we can explain
the representation-user's practical success by pointing to
facts regarding whether the appropriate relation holdsdor
to what degree it holdsdbetween the representational
vehicle and what is represented. Take the map example
again. A map is a useful action-guider only if its structure
matches or resemblesdor to the degree it matches or
resemblesdthe structure of that which it represents (even
when it is a highly idealized and simplified map, like the
map of the London Underground). The existence (or the
degree) of this resemblance is casually relevant to whether
the map successfully guides action.6 To be fair, it needs to be said that A&R at least (2008) do not deny that
representational action guidance can sometimes be achieved by exploiting
structural similarities, or isomorphisms, to bemore precise. However, at the
same time they do not argue that it is co-constitutive of representations that
they guide actions by exploiting isomorphisms. Rather, for A&R, this is just
one empirically plausible way in which representations might work or
become established. This sort of claim is obviously much weaker than the
two-factor theory I am arguing for here, where being a representation is co-
constitutedby the role played in action guidanceby the relation between the
representational vehicle andwhat is represented. Onmy view, if something
is not based on exploiting such a relation, it becomes deeply problematic
how it gets to play a representational role at all.
7 It needs to be said that the choice of structural similarity as the relation
that establishes the correspondence is theoretically important. As the frog
example discussed in previous section shows, if we instead chose a simple
co-variation or causality as the relation that holds between the vehicle and
what is represented, the two-factor theorywould notmeet the JDC. In other
words, not all correspondence-grounding relations are created equal and
not all of them can serve as a basis for a workable two-factor theory of
representation (see also Ramsey, 2007; von Eckhardt, 1993). By choosing
structural similarity as the relation that establishes the correspondence, I
treat internal representations that feature in cognitive-scientific explana-
tions as a species of simulation-, structural- or S-representations (see
Bartels, 2006; Cummins, 1989; O'Brien & Opie, 2004; Ramsey, 2007).
Please cite this article in press as: Gładziejewski, P., Action guidanc
plea for a two-factor theory of representation, New
j.newideapsych.2015.01.005To sum up the discussion so far, the lesson is that rep-
resentations are things that succeed in playing their action-
guiding function by exploiting a certain relation between
the representation itself (the vehicle) and what it repre-
sents. By no means do I think that this says anything rev-
olutionary or new about the nature of representations.
However, it seems to me that it nonetheless shows how
both purely correspondence-centric (or input-centric) and
purely action-centric (or output-centric) accounts of rep-
resentation miss their target. By defending the former type
of theory, we try to reduce representation to the relation
between the representational vehicle and what it repre-
sents. By defending the latter type of theory, we try to
reduce representation to the relationship between the
representational vehicle and the representation user. But
neither of those two ways of construing representations
works. Problems with correspondence-centrism have
already been discussed in detail in the literature (see e.g.
Bickhard, 1993; Bickhard & Terveen, 1995; Miłkowski,
2013). What I have been trying to show here is that
action-centrism does not succeed either, since by focusing
so much on action, it fails to give us an idea about what
distinguishes representational action-guidance from
nonrepresentational action-guidance. However, I also think
that both views describe part of the truth. I propose that to
account for the nature of representations, we need a two-
factor theory that skilfully combines both perspectives by
treating representations as action-guiding structures that
work by exploiting a relation between a representational
vehicle and what is represented (for a somewhat similar
proposal put forward in the context of teleosemantics, see
Shea, 2007, 2013).8 I suggest that only then can we form adeterminedbycovarianceora causal relationbetween the representationand
what it represents) and functional or conceptual role semantics (which states
that representation's content is determined by the functional roles it plays
with regards to perceptual input, other representational states, and action
output). According to the theory advocated by Block and Field, intentional
content is determined both by world-head causal or covariational relations
andthe functional rolesplayedbyrepresentations inacognitive system.There
are at least threemajor differences between this sort of two-factor theory and
the proposal I advocate in the present article. First, they differ with respect to
the problem they attempt to solve. The two-factor theory I defend here is a
theory of what it means for something to function as a representation in a
cognitive system and thus explain cognitive phenomena as a representation.
Thetwo-factor theory thatBlockandFieldopt for isa theoryofmental content,
that is, of how what the representation is about is determined. Second,
although both theories are similar in that they understand one “factor” as a
head-world relation, and the other as a functional property of the represen-
tational vehicle, they nonetheless differ in how they specifically construe
those factors. When it comes to head-world factor, while Block and Field's
theory refers to causation or covariance, the theory on offer here refers to
structural similarity. When it comes to the functional factor, while Block and
Field's theory refers to overall functional roles played by the representational
vehicle,my two-factor theoryrefers solely tohowtherepresentationalvehicle
guides action. Third, contrary to the two-factor theory of mental content, the
proposal on offer here is explicitly committed to the claim that both factors
should be appropriately related to each other, that is, the representation's
success at guiding action should depend on whether head-world rela-
tiondthe structural similaritydholds (see main text for details).
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can explain cognitive phenomena in a genuinely and non-
trivially representational way.
Note also that this two-factor theory can meet Bick-
hard's demand that a successful theory of representation
needs to account for the representation user being able to
detect a representational error. I think that the proponents
of ACToRs are right in saying that in order to account for
representational error detection, we need to closely tie
representations to actions, so that a representation's being
in error can be detected indirectly, by detecting the failure
of an action that was guided by this representation.
Although this idea is basically correct, by itself it is not
enough, as I have shown above, to distinguish between
detecting a representational error from detecting a purely
practical error. To account for an ability to detect genuinely
representational error, we need to show how the action in
questiondthat is, an action failure upon which this detec-
tion is baseddhas been guided by representation in the
first place. And a two-factor account tells us howwe can do
this: a given action was representation-guided if it was
guided by a structure (representational vehicle) whose
success in providing action guidance non-accidentally de-
pends on a relation between this structure itself and that
with respect to which the action is guided (what is repre-
sented). Take the example I have given above. People 1, 2,
and 3 can all potentially fail to get from point A to point B in
an alien city. If they do not succeed, no doubt they can
detect this fact. But in such a case, only person 3 has failed
to achieve success after using a representation-based navi-
gational strategy. Only in her case can the detection of a
practical failure serve as a way of telling that a representa-
tion was in error.
One last, but crucially important thing that should be
mentioned here is that maps or other representational
devices that are cultural artifacts cannot, of course, be un-
qualifiedly treated as models for representations in a sense
that could be explanatorily useful for cognitive science.
Cognitive scientists need a notion of representation that
does not require representations to be interpreted by
cognitive agents with human-level cognitive capacities,
according to culturally constructed and culturally trans-
mitted rules of interpretation (O'Brien & Opie, 2004;
Ramsey, 2007). Is such a notion even achievable?
Answering this question in detail is way beyond the scope
of this article, but I think that the short answer is yes. Take
for example Rick Grush's (1997, 2004) famous emulation
theory of representation. What Grush essentially proposes
is an explanation of motor control according to which, in
order to control the body in a swift and effective manner,
the motor system employs an internal model of the
musculoskeletal system. In line with what Grush himself
claims, I think emulation theory is a genuinely represen-
tational explanation that uses the notion of internal rep-
resentations as mechanical or automated “models” or
“maps”.
I propose that emulators owe their representational
status to the fact that they meet the criteria put forward by
a two-factor theory. For one thing, they meet the “action-
centric” criterion, simply because they are in the business
of guiding actions. As A&R put it, “[ … ] what, exactly, is itPlease cite this article in press as: Gładziejewski, P., Action guidanc
plea for a two-factor theory of representation, New
j.newideapsych.2015.01.005for R to be used as an emulator of E, that is, what ties it to E
in particular? [ … ] Our account answers this crucial
question by saying that R is used as an emulator of E, and is,
therefore, a representation of E, just in case (as with all
representations) R is used to guide the subject's actions
with respect to E [ … ]” (2008, p. 58). This is right. But it is
also incomplete, since it fails to take into account that a
nonrepresentational structure could potentially guide ac-
tions with respect to E. What makes something an emu-
latordand thus a representationdis how it works, namely
in amodel- ormap-like manner. In other words, what is co-
constitutive of an emulator as a form of representation is
that it meets the “correspondence-centric” criterion as
well. An emulator is successful in performing its function
only insofar as it generates adequate anticipations for the
motor system; but it is anticipatory only insofar as the
workings of an emulator “mimic” or resemble the workings
of the body, or the bodyeworld loop. For example, if we
assume that emulators are “articulated”di.e. that they are
composed of elements whose dynamics of interactions are
meant tomodel the dynamics of interactions between parts
of the musculoskeletal system (see Grush, 2004)dthen
they are successful in performing their action-guiding
function to the extent to which the way the emulator
works structurally or dynamically resembles the way the
musculoskeletal system works. This dependence of the
emulator's action-guiding function on the similarity rela-
tion is important for understanding both how emulators
work and what it is exactly that gives them their repre-
sentational status. Last, note that according to Grush (1997,
2004), the results of the emulation process are continu-
ously compared against real-world sensory feedback. I
propose that if the system detects a discrepancy between
the two, this may count as genuine case in which the
discrepancy between the world and its internal mod-
eldthat is, representational errordhas been detected (see
also Miłkowski, 2013).
6. Conclusion
I have tried to show that while not without merits,
ACToRs fall short of providing us with an explanatorily
valuable notion of representation. This is because repre-
sentations, as they are understood in action-centric the-
ories, do not meet William Ramsey's job description
challenge. To show this, I pointed to cognitive structures
that fulfill the ACToR's functional criteria for counting as a
representation, but which (1) quite manifestly do not play a
representational function within a cognitive system, and
thus (2) do not, and cannot explain phenomena qua rep-
resentations. I have also put forward a diagnosis of where
the problem with ACToRs lies exactly. According to this
diagnosis, by putting so much emphasis on the role that
representations play in controlling actions, proponents of
ACToRs have lost sight of what is equally important for
making representations what they are, namely the fact that
using representations consists in exploiting a relation that
holds between the representational vehicle and what is
represented. Last, I have proposed a recipe for this theo-
retical situation by outlining a two-factor theory which
marries the idea that representations are for guiding actione is not enough, representations need correspondence too: A
Ideas in Psychology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
P. Gładziejewski / New Ideas in Psychology xxx (2015) 1e13 13with the idea that representational function depends on
the existence of a correspondence (structural similarity)
between representational vehiclewithwhat is represented.
Without doubt, what I have shown is just a sketch and
there are a lot of questions that this two-factor theory still
faces. For now however, suffice it to conclude that if I am
right, then representations need two legs to stand on in
order to play their explanatory role qua representations in
cognitive science.References
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